I analyze macroeconomic issues from a fundamental perspective, and I analyze market behavior from a technical perspective. Original macroeconomic analysis can be found here and both macro analysis and commentary can be found on my Caps blog. If you like or appreciate my analysis, please add yourself to my Following List
Showing posts with label Macroeconomic. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Macroeconomic. Show all posts

Thursday, November 15, 2012

Thoughts on the Fiscal Cliff

Everybody should read this post by Warren Mosler: more on the cliff. I very much agree with all of the macro observations he is making regarding the cliff and what it means for the stock market going forward. I do not think this was 'the top', I think that after a correction we will have a very nice dip to buy.

So, why do I think we will correct more? Why don't I think we are bottoming now? A few reasons: Because of the *uncertainty* associated with the fiscal cliff. Many pundits are saying that there will be some sort of 'deal' / the 'Grand Bargain' struck either before the end of the year or perhaps at the beginning of the year. The latter is the more interesting and 'uncertain' option being waved out. Basically the Democrats want us to go over the cliff 'just a little' to scare Republicans into some sort of deal. This is completely idiotic on two accounts:

1) The political machine has broken down and is playing chicken with the economy to pass legislation. In this regard the markets are reacting commensurately to this action, no one has any idea what to expect for tax planning going into the end of year. What will tax rates be for 2013? How long does this game of chicken get played? What if there really is no deal struck and the full force of the cliff goes all the way through 2013? Combined with a very dismal earnings season that started bad and got progressively worse (and a massive deficit reduction / full force of the fiscal cliff in 2013 would be bad news for corporate profits) has investors nervous for any delay in some sort of deal

2) There is no 'crisis' to begin with regarding the deficit. The private sector is still retrenched and is still saving (spending less than their income) due to the excesses (spending more than their income) accumulated during the housing bubble. They are rightfully repairing balance sheets. Unemployment is still very high but has been slightly coming down, which means that the private domestic sector is starting to come out of it shell but just barely. It is still fragile. Couple this with the fact that we have a trade deficit. Now in the macroeconomy there are three sectors: Government, Private Domestic and Foreign. The Foreign Sector is running a surplus (which is our trade deficit) and the Private Domestic Sector is running a surplus (saving more than their income to pay down debts) then by definition the Government Sector is running a deficit. And since the US won't magically start running trade surpluses any time soon and combined with the fact that the private sector is nowhere near done with its deleveraging cycle, the government will need to continue to run deficits for the next several years. This goal of trying to cut the deficit in the name of 'fiscal responsibility' will deprive the private domestic sector of income while they still need it desperately. The US Government is not a 'super-household', it issues its own currency. It never faces a 'solvency' constraint. The concept of 'fiscal sustainability' is inapplicable to the US Government. And because we have high unemployment and spare capacity (see the summary at the beginning of this post) we can 'afford' to continue these deficits before we start hitting the real constraint, which is inflation. There is no nominal constraint. For a very good and succinct presentation regarding the budget deficit, see this video by Stephanie Kelton. It is well worth 19 minutes of your time. (Update 11/16: Also read this well-timed post by Warren regarding the deficit).

Back to the markets, I still think there will be some sort of deal put in place regarding the fiscal cliff. Even mainstream economists agree that the full force of the fiscal cliff will put GDP negative in 2013 and virtually guarantee a recession. And while the parties are willing to play chicken with this issue, no one will want to accept responsibility for causing a recession.

Therefore I agree with Warren that the deficits although potentially lower will still be high enough to support aggregate demand (and corporate profits) and with the private sector still slowly coming out of its shell will also support aggregate demand (or be less of a drag as was the case in 2008-2011). Combined with the 'certainty' of a deal we should see a resumption of the cyclical bull market sometime early next year.

My take at any rate.

Thursday, June 21, 2012

Warren Mosler: Macro Take

Fantastic interview with Warren Mosler. He discusses QE, earnings, cash flows, demand leakages, and the potential fiscal cliff.

I completely agree with his take that current levels of deficit spending are still sufficient to maintain aggregate demand (and hence corporate revenues and profits) to a level that is 'good for stocks'. I don't think we are seeing a 'major top' in the stock market. I think the real risk to the stock market and the economy is the *potential* 'fiscal cliff'. But as I said here at the beginning of June this would be the mostly widely telegraphed macro event ever. And like Mosler says, I am highly doubtful that is being 'priced in' to stocks right now.

Which means that I think the current pullback since May (and that we are still potentially in) is a correction and the cyclical bull market will continue, not the start of a cyclical bear market.

Early Thought follow up… A conversation with Warren Mosler

Please click on the link below to listen to a conversation with Warren Mosler. Topics include: Demand leakage (how to fix end-demand), Fed Policy (QE is counterproductive) and overall market/econ outlook for US, Europe and China.


Warren Mosler Interview Audio

Wednesday, April 11, 2012

Long Term Projection, Macro, and an Analysis Retrospective

Since late 2010 I have put together a lot of work that I have shared with the community that I think has been of high quality. It has remained objective and has run counter to mainstream macro, fundamental and technical analysis at the correct times (I was calling a significant top and going short in May 2011 when most of the participants in these communities were looking for moves higher and I was calling a significant bottom and going long in Oct 2011 when most of the participants in these communities were looking for moves lower, and I was calling for new recovery highs in early 2012 when most of communities were looking for lower highs). My analysis has been very timely and actionable, and in January 2011 I started posting the signals from my Trend Systems publicly.

I wanted to review/update my long term projection as I tend to do every few months. But more that that, I wanted to take the opportunity to discuss my previous studies that were very in-depth and has been calling (at lest thus far) the larger trends correctly from fundamental, macro and technical standpoints.

Macroeconomic Developments

My Macro Page has a number of good notable posts that are worth reading. But I would like to highlight three posts in particular related to market developments:

In July 2011 I wrote this post dispelling the myths that Quantitative Easing was 'money printing' and showing what some of the drivers of the rally really were. And it was an extremely timely post warning about a market panic in the near term based on decreasing margin being used, but being very clear at the end of the post that the market was not on the verge of a 'collapse' and that the cyclical bull was not over.

In August 2011, in the middle of the panic, I wrote this post which discussed the reasons why the wave developing down was not the precursor to a bear market with an associated recession. The deficit spending position of the US Government was (and still is) at a high enough level to support aggregate demand and well as allowing the private sector to pay down its debts (it is making progress but the private domestic sector as a whole is still in a balance sheet recession). I was stating that calls for a recession were misguided (keeping in mind this is when the ECRI recession call was gaining substantial popularity).

In January 2012 I wrote this post which discussed both near term and longer term macro realities and risks. I thought that the calls for a recession in the near term were still incorrect and those looking for a 'major top' based on near-term recessionary risks were misguided in January (and still misguided today). However, things are not 'fine' with the US economy and I believe that we are still in a secular bear market because of the associated economic and demographic issues at work (and I think most macro commentary on these matters is incorrect). I simply believe that this secular bear is progressing more slowly (but still in-family with previous secular bear timelines) than most analysts think.

Fundamentals and the Current Cyclical Bull Market

I have been maintaining since Nov 2010 that we are still in a cyclical bull market. And even further, that we are still in the middle of this cyclical bull. And that attempts by those to keep calling 'the' top of it would be met with money-wasting frustration.

I have written many posts regarding the fundamental drivers behind this rally (Corporate profit margins, corporate earnings, etc.) and that none of these items are close to suggesting we are at the end of this cyclical bull:

-- Corporate Profit Margins, the Stock Market and Recessions, Mar 2012
-- Long Term Technicals and Macro, Jan 2012
-- Yet another reason why I don't think we saw 'the' top (3), Nov 2011
-- Yet another reason why I don't think we saw 'the' top, Sept 2011
-- Yet another reason why I don't think this cyclical bull is over, Aug 2011

These are all good reads and I highly suggest taking a look

In-Depth (and Unorthodox) Technical Studies

My 'Moving Average Price-Stretching' study came about by looking at the structure of this secular bear market (since 2000) and thinking about its characteristics and what other periods it was similar to. The original post (Jan 2011: Bear Market Momentum Internals: Examination of Moving Average 'Price Stretching') describes the genesis for this study. I provided an update in Nov 2011: Moving Average 'Price Stretching' Update. I will also include an update here, so far it is still right on track:


The next study that I would like to highlight was my BPSPX study (BPSPX = Bullish Percentage of SPX stocks, a market-based pseudo-sentiment technical indicator). Contrary to the analyst community which largely saw the spike in the BPSPX (to an all-time high) in May 2011 as well as a huge spike in bullish sentiment on a number of surveys as signs of 'the top', my studies have shown that bullish sentiment extremes tend to happen in the *middle* of moves, not at the end of them. There is bullish sentiment spikes at the end too, but they are less pronounced then the move in the middle. The original study is from Feb 2011: The BPSPX and the Secular Bear Count and I did an update in Nov 2011: BPSPX Update. Here is the updated chart:


Next up is my VIX/CPCE chart. My original study from Nov 2011: Yet another reason why I don't think we saw 'the' top (3) made the observation that there was no VIX divergence at the May 2011 peak. And this was another reason (among so many others listed above) that the May peak did not market a 'major top'. That call has since been confirmed with the new recovery highs. Here is an update to the study:



Notable major real-time calls that ran counter to what the larger technical/EW analyst community was saying

There were three calls in particular that I believe has distinguished my track record as a technical analyst because they were timely, actionable and ran counter to what the larger community was saying (rather loudly). This combined with other characteristics (On Mea Culpas, Admitting to Being Wrong, Objectivity, and Changing Stances in the Face of New Evidence) should reinforce the strength of my objectivity in readers minds.

1) The 'Top' Call of May 2011. - I think this particular call distinguishes me in two ways: i) That I was making a call for a significant correction where the rest of the community was looking for a higher high, and ii) the fact that I specifically was not calling *the* top, that this was a 'top' / mid-range correction in a cyclical bull market that was not complete. I made two posts in near real time (within a couple of days of the top) calling this top: (May 2 and May 5 (and a Long Term View Update)). And I performed an in-depth review of this call (both my actions and the actions of the larger EW community) here: Regarding Tops and Sloppy / Misleading EW Practices

2) The bottom Call of Oct 2011 - Another contrarian call where many analysts were still warning of lower lows being imminent. I made a real time call on Oct 5 and I performed an in-depth confirmation a few days later: Revisiting the Large Count.

3) The Call for new Recovery Highs - After the Oct low was established, the EW community was counting the move as a wave 1 impulse down and was contending that were in a wave 2 retrace back up. I had vehemently rejected that count since August 10 showing why it was completely incorrect to count the move as an impulse down. And after the 'five-wave structure' had developed after the Oct low was established, I was the minority voice (if not the lone voice) discussing why that impulse count was still invalid (chart from November, note the observation at the top regarding the Nasdaq). But while many were expecting the move to stop going up because they were mistakenly calling it a Wave 2 (because of the mistaken/biased call that the preceding move down was a Wave 1 impulse), I was looking for new recovery highs: EW Shenanigans.

Long Term Projection History and the Current Projection

I have a long track record of being consistent with my projection. It has obviously adjusted based on how events actually unfolded (absolutely *nobody* can predict the future), but this long term projection which serves as my preferred count has been quite good in general directionality and intermediate timing.

-- Nov 2010: Abandoned the Primary 2 count and adapted my leading alternate count which was a Cycle X count - The Large Count

-- Jan 2011: Rethought the size of Cycle X with some historical analysis and comparisons. I lay out my thoughts for March 2009 - June 2011 (projection at the time) being only Primary W of Cycle X - The Large Count with Historical Perspective

-- Jan 2011: Macro thoughts that accompany my projection - Macro Thoughts and Observations. Is the Bear Market Dead? Is this the Start of a new Secular Bull Market?

-- Feb 2011: Long term context - Secular Bear Market Projection in Historical Context

-- Mar 2011: An in depth study and a comprehensive list of references and analysis of previous work. I highly recommend reading this post and following the references - First Derivative of the S&P 500, Long Term Study

-- May 2011: Count of the large structure (the top of this wave) being completed in real time - May 5 (and a Long Term View Update)

-- Aug 2011: Macro thoughts in the middle of the August crash putting this wave in context (specifically refuting that this was the start of 'P3') - Update on Long Term Projection

-- Oct 2011: Real time count that pointed to the October low as being a significant low based on how the waves and indicators unfolded - Revisiting the Large Count

-- Jan 2012: Confirmation of the October low being a significant bottom - Update on Long Term Projection

Primary Wave Projection



Secular Bear Market Projection / Long Term Count



4-year Cycle Chart

This chart comes from this study (A Look at 4-year Cycles) and fits pretty nicely with my long term projection.

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Corporate Profit Margins, the Stock Market and Recessions

There are two must read posts up at PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM, BERNSTEIN: BEWARE THE PROFIT RECESSION and JAMES MONTIER: THE RISK TO CORPORATE PROFITS…. The points discussed in these posts are points that I have discussed over the past year as well (edit 3/22: See this post also, Warren Mosler: Corporate Profit Margins Highest Ever). See:

-- Yet another reason why I don't think this cyclical bull is over - Aug 28, 2011
-- Long Term Technicals and Macro - Jan 28, 2012

Please read the above posts as there are lots of good details and background discussion. But here are the summary points:
  • Corporate Profits increase during an economic expansion (as expected)

  • The stock market does not increase on current earnings, but rather expected earnings

  • However the analyst community is generally very bad at forecasting earnings at tops and bottoms, they tend to lag the earnings cycle. By this I mean that they are, as a community, too pessimistic at bottoms and too optimistic at tops

  • Corporate profit margins and corporate earnings tend to peak out *before* the stock market peak, as the analyst community is still forecasting earnings growth when the fundamentals have already begun deteriorating

  • This is a key divergence that has happened at many market tops and is a catalyst for a market correction (usually a major one)

  • Since the 1960s, the sequence has been for corporate profit margins to peak, which sets up deteriorating fundamentals, which sets up an stock market peak. This typically occurs with deteriorating fundamentals in the broader economy and happens in conjunction with a recession.

I have discussed the drivers for corporate profits in my first link above and I discuss the current macro environment and the fact that current levels of deficit spending are sufficient to support aggregate demand and in turn support corporate profits in my second link above.

And while I think we are near a cycle high in corporate profits and do believe we are currently peaking or near a peak, it is precisely because of the above observations that I don't think a 'major' stock market peak is forming here. These fundamental divergences typically take a long time (months/years) to play out. The stock market move will peter out and roll over as it becomes clear that the fundamentals have already deteriorated (which has not happened yet).

See this graph that I put together from FRED data to illustrate my point. The graph shows the trend illustrated above playing out since the 1960s. The exception being in the 1974 crash where the corporate profit margin peak was slightly after the stock market peak (a similar event can be seen in this chart):



Combined with many more observations (as detailed here) I think this cyclical bull market still has legs, and I continue to think that calls for a 'major top' formation here are misguided.

Saturday, January 28, 2012

Long Term Technicals and Macro

As much as I like and use Elliott Wave (and I do), it is not my 'primary' analysis method. Readers of this site know that I perform macro analysis as well as TA to understand where we are in the cycles. I use EW in conjunction with all of my other analysis, because I find (for me at least) that a balance of everything is required to stay objective. This is another reason why I have different time periods with my Trend System, because things move differently on the 60-min timeframe vs. the Daily timeframe vs. the Weekly timeframe. I know (as should everyone) that every downturn in the market is not 'the top', that there are many corrections in ongoing bull markets. Not every cycle moves in conjunction and shorter cycles can move in the opposite direction of longer term cycles, and these manifest as either good buying or shorting opportunities depending on the longer term cycle direction.

But to get to the point of this post, it is a look at where we are in the current cyclical and secular market cycles. No 'projections' (only some rough directional calls), no Elliot Wave, just some simple TA sprinkled with a few macro observations.

The Current Cyclical Bull Market

We are in a cyclical bull market. One began in March 2009. Making the current cyclical bull less than 3 years old. Do I think this cyclical bull market is over? No. There are a number of reasons why I am not looking for a 'major top' here (and think that one did not happen in May 2011).

-- Moving Average 'Price Stretching' Update, Nov 2011
-- BPSPX Update, Nov 2011
-- Yet another reason why I don't think we saw 'the' top (3), Nov 2011
-- Yet another reason why I don't think we saw 'the' top, Sept 2011
-- Yet another reason why I don't think this cyclical bull is over, Aug 2011

All of these studies look at the trends of market internals as well as earnings and corporate profit margins, and show why the odds of a major top occurring in the middle of 2011 are highly unlikely. Here is some more evidence:

The Nasdaq 100 has already made new recovery highs. Technology is a critical component of the modern economy and the Nasdaq 100 has been an undisputed leader in market cycles: It peaked decidedly in 2000 while the rest of the markets hung around for a few months, it made a definitive low in 2002 while the rest of the markets were retesting in 2003, it made a bottom in 2008 and only retested it while other market made lower lows in 2009. So anyone who calls a 'major top' here while an undisputed leader index is making new recovery highs is making a very uninformed/biased call indeed:


Looking at the market internals we see any call for a top is extremely unfounded:


For crying out loud nothing about this chart is bearish for the 2011 top, whereas *everything* was bearish for the 2007 top. Again, no evidence for a top call based on a look at multiple sets of market internals.


Here is just a clean look at moving averages and comparisons between bull and market cycles. And like I observed on my BPSPX post (BPSPX Update, see the original post in the link), bull markets top as 'processes' not 'events'. Things peter out and roll over. This is not at all what describes the 2011 top


Macro

From a macro standpoint, the United States is still acting in a manner that can continue to be supportive of a bull market. Please see the introductory macro thoughts in this post: Update on Long Term Projection.

The United States Government is still continuing to run large deficits, which it needs to in order to support the savings desires / paying down of debt in the private domestic sector and to support aggregate demand. And for all of you who think (incorrectly) that "deficits are always evil, will crowd out private investment, will raise interest rates, will cause hyperinflation, will anger the US bond market vigilantes" or whatever mainstream uninformed macroeconomic myths that you are adhering to, read this post: Why Deficit Spending and Creative Destruction are not Mutually Exclusive Positions, and then after that read these posts: Regarding the Myth that Austerity promotes Fiscal Expansion, What would happen if the US Federal Government stopped issuing bonds?, The Real Macro Risks.

The Ongoing Secular Bear Market

Yet things in the economy are not hunky-dory. We still have a financial system that was never reformed at the end of the last crisis, that still takes enormous risks, and is still a massive parasite/drag on the economy due to it size and non-productive nature (it exists only to extract economic rents). See section 5 near the end of this post.

Additionally demographics will have headwind on the economy for the next 10 years. Retiring baby boomers (in increasing numbers) will be selling assets (stocks, bonds, houses / downsizing) and reducing consumption as they go through retirement. Many also were counting on pension benefits that they no longer have which will also put a headwind on asset prices.

The environment (in most developed economies) is not conducive to economic expansion. People are downsizing and selling as a whole (the biggest segment of the economy) as well as the majority of the economy (including boomers and many other segments) are still in a balance sheet recession.

Also corporate profit margins are near a cycle high. And while that means that I don't think right now is the end of the cyclical bull (precisely for that reason), it means that the next peak in the stock market in a few years will happen on lower profit margins and lower earnings (likely revenues will start to weaken as well). This is part of the rolling over 'process' (tops don't happen on earnings and margin expansions, they tend to happen on downside of a compression cycle).

On top of that, while the US government is running significant deficits currently, deficit hawks and austerity rhetoric ('the US is going the way of Greece' and other such nonsense, if anything the US is going the way of Japan) are becoming more prominent in the media and in Congress. This bodes very badly for the US macroeconomic environment for the next several election cycles if that sentiment (which is becoming increasingly popular) starts to take hold and significantly affects fiscal policy decisions.

For those reasons and many more I continue to think that the secular bear market which started in 2000 is not over.

I have done many studies on secular trends, but sometimes the simplest ones are the cleanest.

This is a look at the last two major secular bears in real terms. I fully understand that three periods is not a significant statistical data set, but these secular periods take a long time to unfold (and hence there are not many to analyze). Likely most investors ever live though only one secular cycle (upside and downside). Doing an examination of this chart, we can see that in comparison the current secular bear market would be historically truncated time-wise if it ended in 2009. Additionally from a channel analysis, whether you consider the based channel or the channels to be accelerating up, at no point did we revisit any of the lower channel lines.


However, the last cyclical bear market was severe and retraced nearly the full amount in price (compared to the other two). This is reason (among many others) why I don't expect a much lower low (if at all) than the 2009 low. Certainly nothing like a 'triple-digit Dow' or anything like others are calling for.

I simply think there is going to be one more cyclical bear to finish out the secular bear.

Tuesday, November 1, 2011

The Real Macro Risks

Here is a good post by Warren Mosler.

The risk is not from US Sovereign Debt, the risk is not from 'bond vigilantes', the risk is not from relying on the 'kindness of strangers' to 'finance' the US. There are no US Government Bond Market 'Vigilantes', nor is the US Government 'financed' by anybody, it is the sole issuer of the US Dollar and is the source of all Dollars in existence.

So what are the real risks? This is one:
Meanwhile, the 1% running the US looks to be trying to take the lead in the global austerity race to the bottom as the Democrats in the super committee on deficit reduction have led off by proposing a $4 trillion deficit reduction package.

With the US consumer still in the middle of a balance sheet recession, and the Financial Sector still posing a risk to economic stability, and with the US economy having >9% unemployment and >35% labor under-utilization, and with inflation being moderate (and most of that is producer constrained cost-push inflation) and not even remotely demand-pull, we have no issue with the economy 'overheating'. We have a massive problem of deficient demand, and a $4 Trillion deficit reduction will be $4 Trillion sucked out of an economy when demand is already far too low.

Those who seek to massively cut the deficit (or worse, balance the budget) in the name of 'avoiding a Depression' will be the ones to cause it.

If this austerity effort makes serious headway, like I said here and here, then my sideways 'muddle-though' secular bear market projection becomes much less likely and something far more dramatic and bearish starts becoming probable.

Sunday, October 30, 2011

Long Term Thoughts on the RUT

Okay, it's time for Crazy Uncle binve's Unpopular Opinion and EW Count Time!

Today's installment will be regarding the Russell 2000.

First, let me say that this has been a point of particular focus of Blankfiend, such as this post and several others. I really appreciate his efforts because the RUT does not display the same characteristics as the other indices.

Second, let me say that I am expecting little to no agreement with this post. In fact, I am expecting to get a lot of disagreement / 'what are you smoking' type comments like those that I got with this post.

Third, I think most of the standard macroeconomic analysis that accompanies long term projections is partially if not completely flawed. I think only a tiny minority of analysts actually understand monetary systems. I think only a tiny minority understand that the US and the EMU operate under fundamentally different monetary systems. I think only a tiny minority understand what a sovereign debt crisis really is and the fact the the US has no sovereign debt crisis whatsoever (except for a self-imposed 'debt' ceiling constraint). There are no US Government Bond Market 'Vigilantes'. The US is not on the doorstep of a hyperinflationary depression.

I think I see things a bit differently than most TA and EWP analysts out there.

I view long term trends through the lens of macroeconomic policy decisions. And currently, while the US is cutting back spending, it is not embracing full-blown austerity. This means that current deficits of ~9% of GDP are supporting aggregate demand in the economy, and stocks can still generate reasonable profits and profit growth in this environment. Not stellar, but enough to limp along. Remember, the stock market is not the economy.

But there are major long term risks. NOT US sovereign debt (which is not a bubble, despite those trying to call the top in it). But the size of the financial sector and the continued financialization of the US economy. I think the financial sector, and the instability it promotes, is the biggest impediment to long term growth. And we saw from the 2008 crisis that the financial system was not reformed (even though we had our chance). TBTF was allowed to become TBiggerTF. See section 5 of this post.

My point is that the US can continue to limp along so long as austerity is not embraced (Of course, like I said here and here, if the US significantly embraces austerity, then all bets are off and look out below.). But that the instability that the Financial Sector creates will precipitate another cyclical bear market.

That in a nutshell is my macro stance:

1. We are in a secular bear market, because the cancer (size of the Financial sector) was never removed from the economy
2. The instability that the Financial Sector creates will precipitate another cyclical bear market
3. The next cyclical bear market will cause enough animosity that there will be political will to finally reform the financial sector
4. At the end of the next cyclical bear will be the end of the secular bear market (that started in 2000), and the next secular bull will begin
5. As long as the US does not fully embrace austerity, then a Great Depression-type scenario can be avoided. If it does embrace austerity, then all bets are off and look out below (and God help the US economy and population).

My long term thoughts that go along with these macroeconomic conditions are described in a few posts:

-- Update on Long Term Projection
-- Secular Bear Market Projection in Historical Context
-- Lessons (To Be) Learned... again.
-- Real Secular Bear Markets

Also, there is a lot of good background reading in this post: First Derivative of the S&P 500, Long Term Study and My macro tab.

So how the the RUT fit into all of this?

I think calling the RUT a major broad market index is misleading. I think the RUT is to the SPX as what JNK is to LQD (roughly speaking, I am *not* suggesting that all RUT stocks are 'junk' stocks). They each measure different things. But I think the SPX is a closer representation of the the expectations of what is happening in corporate America and the US economy than the RUT is. I think the RUT is a measure of smaller and much more speculative issues.

As such the RUTs gains and losses are much more exaggerated. And as the financialization of the economy continues and leveraged money continues to look for gains, it will find its way into riskier assets. And yes, I think the RUT is a much riskier asset class than the SPX. And so I think that this 'overshoot' phenomena to the upside on the cyclical bulls (and much higher than then end of the last secular bull) can be explained by this observation.

With that, here are my thoughts on the monthly chart of RUT:


I am calling the end of the secular bull in the RUT a bit earlier (1998) than then end of the secular bull in the SPX (2000). And what we can see is that the 'middle wave overshoot' phenomena occurs relatively early on in this large corrective period.

I think one of the keys to recognizing this is the fact that the move from 2002-2007 is clearly not an impulse. However you want to subdivide it, it looks and counts like a corrective wave up that goes to clearly new highs. Yet it is not an impulse (and hence cannot be the start of the new secular bull market).

The upshot is that I think the RUT, like the SPX, is in the middle of its secular bear market. And if I am correctly identifying the end of the previous secular bull (500 in 1998) then the next cyclical bear (and likely the end of the secular bear as well, subject to the macro caveats above) will make one more move below this level.

Friday, August 5, 2011

Update on Long Term Projection

Preface:

This might seem like an odd time to update my long term thoughts. We are in the middle of a panic (maybe even a crash), things are in turmoil. Both Republicans and Democrats made an absolute spectacle out of this idiotic debt ceiling debate, there is major nervousness about the EMU debt issues, there are concerns over economic slowing (GDP growth was low and revised down), etc. Some legitimate topics for concern.

But really, the market just needed to correct from the previous rally, that was driven mostly by margin (and some fundamentals, earnings were good the last couple of quarters) based on the rampant misconceptions of QE2: See Margin Debt, the Stock Market, and QE and Easily the best summary post of the effects of QE2 that I have yet read. Stocks were high mostly on a lot of speculative betting, the buying pressure leveled off, then stocks traded in a range for a couple of months waiting for a catalyst for a correction. I think the crux of the situation is no more complicated than that.

So whether today marked the low for the bottom of this wave or not, I tend to think we are near it. We already started to see some fear abate today in this panic right around some major support level for the stock market. I think when this wave does bottom it will be the end of an Intermediate wave down. Which is interesting as I see all kinds of 'impulse counts' down being armed on so many EW bloggers charts.

My position remains that this is not the 'Top'. I see 'P2' labels popping up all over the place now (after they missed it for months), see Regarding Tops and Sloppy / Misleading EW Practices. But I don't think this is P2 or anything equivalent.

However, I would have seriously considered changing my opinion if the US Government had gone into balanced budget mode, as either a compromise or because of lack of one (if there was no compromise, then the Treasury would have gone into its own balanced budget mode, since it can't make discretionary spending choices, those have to be approved by Congress). If that would have happened it would be the largest anti-stimulus measure likely ever seen. Trillions of dollars would have been sucked out of the economy. See this post for more: Regarding the Myth that Austerity promotes Fiscal Expansion.

But I don't think the macro supports that 'dire' view. For the next couple of quarters, it looks like the budget deficits will be mostly intact. Deficits will still be around 9% of GDP, which is approximately the same as last year (there are some cuts, but they are not huge). And as Warren Mosler pointed out: "The first half of this year demonstrated that corporate sales and earnings can grow at reasonable rates with modest GDP growth. That is, equities can do reasonably well in a slow growth, high unemployment environment." But there are cuts and other headwinds at work. So I still think the next year or so will not be a 'crash', but not 'growth' either. I think we will be mostly rangebound/sideways for the next year. I think it will make for some very ugly trading as people try to understand this environment.

Long term, however, I continue to not be optimistic. I am *very* long term optimistic and bullish about the US economy and American society and resourcefulness. But currently we still have a Financial System that truly is a parasite sucking much of the life out of the economy and giving no productive work back (see Why Deficit Spending and Creative Destruction are not Mutually Exclusive Positions). We still have deficit spending that is simply propping up Financials and the status quo, and is not being geared toward productive economic activity even though we can most definitely 'afford' it (see the previous link for some thoughts).

And perhaps the worst problem is that mainstream economists and politicians still don't understand our monetary system. The idiotic debt ceiling debate absolutely proved that. Everyone (except those of us in the tiny minority) seems to think that "Federal Government deficits = bad, Government surplus = good!" as a blanket statement, without any consideration to what is happening in the other two sectors of the macroeconomy. And so it seems to me that in the next couple of years a "balanced budget" or (God forbid) a "balanced budget amendment" will be passed before the economy is cleaned out. Those who advocate austerity to 'avoid a depression' will be the ones to cause it. Perhaps this isn't a foregone conclusion for the next decade, but it seems like an awfully big risk. (See this post).

So until I see evidence that both Financials are getting broken up and the industry forcibly altered from a 'Too Big Too Fail' condition and widespread understanding of how our monetary system actually works, I do think another economic crisis is likely and my long term projection reflects that possibility.



Here is an update on my long term projection. It hasn't changed in the last several months, so there will be no new long term analysis in this post. Just some chart updates and references to my previous work so you can follow why I arrived at this projection.

-- Nov 2010: Abandoned the Primary 2 count and adapted my leading alternate count which was a Cycle X count - The Large Count

-- Jan 2011: Rethought the size of Cycle X with some historical analysis and comparisons. I lay out my thoughts for March 2009 - June 2011 (projection at the time) being only Primary W of Cycle X - The Large Count with Historical Perspective

-- Jan 2011: Macro thoughts that accompany my projection - Macro Thoughts and Observations. Is the Bear Market Dead? Is this the Start of a new Secular Bull Market?

-- Feb 2011: Long term context - Secular Bear Market Projection in Historical Context

-- Mar 2011: An in depth study and a comprehensive list of references and analysis of previous work. I highly recommend reading this post and following the references - First Derivative of the S&P 500, Long Term Study

-- May 2011: Count of the large structure (the top of this wave) being completed in real time - May 5 (and a Long Term View Update)

Rally from July 2010 - May 2011. It is corrective, not impulsive. Subsequent price action is also corrective, not impulsive


Last two Primary Waves and upcoming Primary Wave projection


Update on the BPSPX with regard to the last two cyclical bull and bear markets, and the current cyclical bull market (The BPSPX and the Secular Bear Count)


Secular Bear Market Projection

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

A Decent Macroeconomic Filter

You will not find a lack of macroeconomic commentary in the media or on the internet. Numerous 'experts' (the supply of which now seem to be growing exponentially) are constantly offering prognostications and dire warnings. Topics discussed range from Government Debt to Money Supply Growth to the likelihood of QE (3,4,5, etc.) to the Federal Reserve, etc.

So many opinions that differ so greatly, how could they all know what they are talking about?

Here are my 'filters' to tune out the noise so that I don't waste time reading garbage, and can immediately skip to more useful pieces of analysis.

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Filter #1: If the opening paragraph contains the line "The US debt debate reveals a nation living beyond its means" (or something substantially similar) ignore it and click on to the next reading item

Through a (non-rigorous) empirical study I have come up with the following approximations:

-- 70% of these articles are provocative / inciting that use a lot of rhetoric, backed heavily by ideology (as a substitute for analysis), written in very dire and immediate language, and rely heavily on CAPITALIZATION for EMPHASIS and likely has at least one string of three or more exclamation points !!!

-- 20% of these articles are calmer than the first group and seem like they are being reasonable. Technical economic terms will be used, such as: The debt situation is a severe problem because it is 'crowding out' private investment. As our Debt/GDP ratio escalates, we fill face a funding crisis as America finds tighter 'access to capital'. The more America spends the more 'upward pressure on interest rates' there will be in the 'loanable funds market', etc.. This inevitably leads to a citation of Reinhart and Rogoff and Debt/GDP thresholds.

-- 10% of these articles say that the deficit is a problem, but not an immediate problem. We have to deal with the economy first before we have to deal with the debt problem in the future.

If you have a chance to talk to the author or comment on the articles, ask this simple question: "If America faces a funding crisis (not able to sell 'debt' to finance its spending) then how did the non-Government sector (private domestic and foreign sectors) get the money to buy the debt in the first place?". Since they wrote the article that had the line The US debt debate reveals a nation living beyond its means to begin with, their answer is completely irrelevant. It will just reveal how much of a hack they are (a parrot repeating other peoples warnings) or if they give a reasoned (but incorrect) answer.

Filter #2: Ignore any article comparing the USA to Greece (or any other EMU country)

It doesn't depend on the argument in the slightest. If the author is a talking about Debt/GDP, entitlements, love of Ouzo (actually I rescind that one), whatever, it doesn't matter.

The USA and Greece (and any EMU country) operate under fundamentally different currency systems. The USA is sovereign issuer of the US Dollar in a fiat currency floating exchange rate monetary system and never issues debt not denominated in the US Dollar. All EMU countries have ceded monetary authority to the ECB and as such each EMU member country is a currency user of the Euro, not an issuer (in exactly the same fashion that US States are currency users of the US Dollar). As such EMU countries are revenue constrained.

Filter #3: If an article attempts to makes any reference to 'debt monetization' (other than to discredit it) skip it and move on to the next

Here is where the term 'debt monetization' comes from: Under the Gold Standard, US Dollars were convertible into Gold which made US Government bonds, which were convertible into Dollars, then indirectly convertible into Gold. So when the Federal Reserve would issue currency in exchange for those bonds, the debt would become 'monetized'.

We have not been on the Gold Standard since 1971. Today bond issuance serves one, and only one, purpose in US monetary operations: to drain reserves from the banking system to allow the Federal Reserve to manage the overnight lending rate (the rate at which banks lend reserves to each other in order to meet their reserve requirements) so that it is at their target rate (the Federal Funds Rate).

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If you follow these filters, you will skip 90-95% of the articles out there and find the 5-10% that are doing some original thinking and analysis about our monetary system and the problems our economy faces.

I came up with these filters because I kept reading the same (incorrect) arguments over and over again. So I then remembered the truism: "If everybody is thinking the same thing, then nobody is thinking".

Monday, August 1, 2011

Why Deficit Spending and Creative Destruction are not Mutually Exclusive Positions

There is much criticism leveled at MMT that it is a 'Free Lunch' theory or that it's main purpose is to preserve the status quo by not allowing deflation and the liquidation of malinvestment to occur. I agree those are legitimate concerns. Because frankly how recent administrations (both Republican and Democratic) have implemented fiscal policy (and have allowed those in control of monetary policy to run amok) would lead one to believe that governments will implement policies in the worst possible fashion.

I will discuss monetary systems and political decisions within the framework of those systems a little later in the post.

But I wanted to tackle some MMT framework up front (because there continue to be basic misunderstandings on how our monetary system actually works) to set the stage for the real constraints in our current system and how policies move against those constraints. And then to explain some opinions on how policies could be implemented to promote stability (smooth out fluctuations in the business cycle), curb malinvestment, and promote long term economic growth.

1. MMT Framework, and What are Federal Government Deficits?

What follows here is not a comprehensive description of the MMT framework (it couldn't possibly be). For a very good (if not the best) place to start: See this post

We must start with a model of the macroeconomy of a sovereign currency issuer of a fiat currency floating exchange rate monetary system. Examples of which are: the United States, Australia, Japan, Canada, Great Britain, etc. The EMU countries [Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, etc.] do *NOT* fall into this category. The EMU is a fundamentally different system. This model is derived by looking at GDP from both the sources and uses perspective into order to come up with a 'sectoral balances' model.

-- Macroeconomic Sectoral Balance Model

The key concept in this section will be the derivation of the Macroeconomic Sectoral Balance Equation

First, we define GDP from the perspective of 'sources'

GDP = C + I + G + (X-M)

C = Private consumption
I = Private investment
G = Government Spending
(X-M) = Net exports - Net Imports

Next we define GDP from the perspective of 'uses'

GDP = C + S + T

C = Private consumption
S = Private savings
T = Government Taxes

Equate the two

C + I + G + (X-M) = GDP = C + S + T

=> C + I + G + (X-M) = C + S + T (Cancel C, on both sides)
=> I + G + (X-M) = S + T

Now rearrange into a more useful form:

(G-T) = (S-I) - (X-M)

This is the macroeconomic sectoral balance equation. What this says is Net government spending (G-T, which is spending minus taxation) equals Net private savings (S-I, which is savings minus money spent on investment) minus net exports (X-M, exports minus imports, or the current account).

When the government spends money, it has to go somewhere. It either goes into the private sector and is either saved, invested, or spent, or it goes to the foreign sector. Some portion of that money comes back to the government in the form of taxes.

If we run a few scenarios just to see how the sectors interrelate:

If X-M is positive (more exports than imports) and S-I is negative (the private sector is investing more than it is saving) then the government is in surplus (G-T is less than zero, which means it taxes more than it spends).

If X-M is negative (more imports than exports) and S-I is positive (the private sector is saving more than it is spending) then the government is in deficit (G-T is greater than zero, which means it spends more than it taxes).

-- Macroeconomic stocks and flows

A 'flow' is an economic quantity (in this post it is assumed that the quantity is in terms of US Dollars) measured over a unit of time. For example GDP is a flow (the net economic activity generated in a quarter or a year). The US Budget deficit is a flow (how much the Federal Government spends more than it taxes over a year).

A 'stock' is an economic quantity (again in terms of Dollars). The US National Debt is a stock.

'Flows' accumulate to 'Stocks'. At the end of a measurement period, the US Budget Deficit accumulates to the National Debt.

You cannot compare stocks and flows in any meaningful way. You compare stocks against stocks, you compare flows against flows. These both give ratios. But comparing stocks and flows gives you a number in units of time. For example: The US National Debt (say $50 Trillion) / The US GDP (say $10 Trillion/yr) gives you a result of 5 years. This is not a meaningful metric, because it has no context.

-- How does money get into our financial system?

The key concepts in this section will be 'horizontal' vs. 'vertical' money creation and currency 'issuer' vs. currency 'users'. See here for more detail

Let's start with a simple case. The Government runs a balanced budget (G-T) = 0 and the Current Account is balanced (X-M) = 0.

Since (G-T) = (S-I) - (X-M), and substituting in the above values:
0 = (S-I) - 0 => (S-I) = 0

Which means that the private domestic sector is in balance (S-I) = 0, or S = I. The definition of *net* saving for any person or company is to consume and invest less than your income. And when you aggregate all of these individual savings states over the entire private domestic sector you get the *net* savings state of the sector. And in this case there is no net savings. With a Government balanced budget and a Balanced current account it cannot be any other way. There are individuals that are saving *more* than they invest and consume and there are individuals that are saving *less* than they invest and consume, but on net these states balance each other such that there is no *net* saving. Remember from the above equations, consumption is both a use and a source (spending = income) so the actual state of consumption does not affect the *net* savings position (which is dependent on both savings and investment). So how does money move into and through this system?

-- Enter Horizontal money creation.

In this example the Federal Government balance is zero (G-T) = 0. This could mean that the Government spends $1 Trillion and taxes $1 Trillion, or spends $0 and taxes $0. Let's just say it spends $0 and taxes $0 for now to illustrate the horizontal money creation process (we will fix this contrived setup in the next example).

Individuals could trade their 'stock' (see above) of previously accumulated money between each other. But that doesn't answer any questions like: how did they get that money to begin with? I will be tackling this next. But there are entities that can generate new money: banks.

A bank makes a loan (creates money out of thin air) to any credit worthy customer. However, the bank cannot simply give the money away, it must record that transaction as a liability on its own balance sheet. Which means that the bank did not increase the *net* amount of money in the financial system. It created an asset (money out of thin air) but also created a liability of equal magnitude (that loan/money must be paid back). The fact that this transaction did not generate any *net* financial assets is why it is called a 'horizontal' transaction.

What is true for an individual bank is also true for the entire banking system. The banking system cannot by itself create *net* financial assets. All money loaned into existence must be paid back (or defaulted on).

As a real world example of this situation, consider the lending boom from 2002-2007. Absolutely mammoth amounts of money was loaned into existence by the banking system. But any credit boom necessarily has a credit bust, because the dynamics are unstable. If a person's income does not grow sufficiently to service their interest payments they become insolvent. A bank system has no incentive to lend to an insolvent party. So that individual must cut consumption to service the debt. This is true for individuals and is also true for the aggregated banking system and private domestic sector. As individuals cut consumption (and spending = income) to service debt payments, by definition any transactions subsequent to that decision have less income. Less income means a greater debt servicing ratio => less income for the next part => greater debt servicing ratio for the next party, etc. The next party might be a company and seeing a loss in income will start to run down their inventories and lay people off. Forced unemployment further compounds this dynamic. These are the mechanics of how a credit contraction manifests at both the micro and macro levels. This is what we see in 2008-present.

Horizontal transactions can lead to credit booms and credit contractions/busts. But Horizontal transactions can *never* lead to the accumulation of *net* financial assets. So what can lead to the accumulation of net financial assets?

-- Enter Vertical money creation.

So let's add some more complexity to our simple scenario. The Government runs a deficit (G-T) > 0 and the Current Account is balanced (X-M) = 0.

Since (G-T) = (S-I) - (X-M), and substituting in the above values:
(G-T) = (S-I) - 0 => (S-I) = (G-T)

Which means that the private domestic sector net savings position (saving more than it invests) is *exactly equal to* the government net deficit spending position (spending more than it taxes).

If you haven't seen that before, let that sink in for a minute.

From the first example, we showed that the banking system by itself cannot generate net financial assets. Which means that the answer to the question "how did they get that money to begin with?" has two answers: 1) *NOT* from the banking system, 2) From previous Government deficit spending.

The reason why we have net savings (accumulated net financial assets) is because the Federal government spent those net financial assets into existence.

This is precisely what the national 'debt' is. It is the accumulated net financial assets of the non-Government sector (the private domestic sector and the foreign sector) based on the accumulated deficit spending position of the US Federal Government. To the penny.

But how does Government spending manifest? If the private domestic sector and banking system *cannot* generate net financial assets by themselves, and the Government spends by issuing debt (so we are told), but government spending is also responsible for providing the non-government sector with net financial assets to begin with, how could they have the money to buy the 'debt'? How can government spending be 'debt'?

The Government spends by crediting private sector bank accounts that exist at the Federal Reserve. This credit has no corresponding liability. This is why this spending is called 'vertical'. A 'horizontal' transaction (bank lending) is termed that way because it generates and asset *and* a liability. A 'vertical' transaction generates only an asset.

This is precisely how 'net' financial assets can manifest in the financial system and can be accumulated. By the Government creating net financial assets via deficit spending. Federal Government taxation does the opposite, it destroys net financial assets. For a more detailed description, refer here (Read the whole thing, but especially the section 'Mechanics of Federal Spending')

But if the Government credits private sector bank accounts, where does it 'get' the money to begin with? It creates it out of thin air. Just as a bank creates money out of thin air when it loans money into existence (with a corresponding liability), the Government creates money out of thin air when it spends money into existence (with *no* corresponding liability).

It is now self-evident that the Government does not need to be 'funded' in order to spend. The government does not need 'income'. It can credit private sector bank accounts (move numbers in a spreadsheet) at any time and does so each and every day when it spends on DoD projects, Social Security payments, Government payroll, etc. It doesn't wait for taxes to be paid to provide it with 'funds'.

-- Enter the currency issuer.

When we pay our taxes every April 15th, the spreadsheets that say how many 'dollars' you have are debited from your bank and added back to the Treasury's Tax and Loan accounts at the Fed. So what happens then, does the Treasury say 'Now we have more money and we can now spend it'. No. They can always spend at any time regardless of tax inflows. Paying your taxes does not mean the government saves them and can spend them later. It is the currency issuer, it can *always* spend any time it wants by crediting private sector bank accounts.

Let's make this clearer. Now lets say instead of paying your electronically you actually go to your bank make a withdrawal in the amount of taxes you owe, go down to your IRS office and pay your taxes in cash. Does the Treasury 'save' those dollars? Nope. Most likely it records the transaction and shreds the paper money. If they are in good condition, they might put them back into circulation.

The point being that concept of a sovereign currency issuer 'saving' in the fiat currency that they have monopoly control of and create on demand at any time is a meaningless concept. It is like saying an alchemist can 'save' gold, even though they can create as much gold as they need at any time. An alchemist saving gold does neither inhibit nor help the alchemist from creating gold at any time. It is an inapplicable concept.

This means that US Government Bond issuance does not 'fund' US Government spending. US Government Tax collection does not 'fund' US Government spending.

-- Enter the currency user.

The Federal Government spends money into existence by crediting private sector bank accounts. It can never 'not' have money. It is an inapplicable concept. It follows that the Government can never become 'insolvent'. It never has to 'finance' its spending. It can always 'afford' to create money (out of thin air) to honor any US Dollar denomination obligation. Always.

The non-Government sector (private domestic and foreign sectors) cannot. They are currency users of the US Dollar. Citizens, Corporations, US States, and Foreign Countries are all currency users of the US Dollar. They do have to finance their spending. In order for any of those entities to be able to accumulate net financial assets the Federal Government must first spend them into existence.

This is the paradigm between currency issuers and currency users. Currency users are dependent on the currency issuer to spend financial assets into existence. By imposition of a tax that is payable *only* in the financial assets that the Government provides (in this case US Dollars), a demand for the currency is created. Fiat currency is not a real resource. It is one thing only: a tax credit. (A 'tax credit' and 'debt' are *not* synonymous). It is not valuable in and of itself. It is a unit of account that is utilized to facilitate trade and commerce. That is what makes it 'useful'.

-- Is calling government spending 'debt' accurate?

No. Debt allows a party to spend more that their income temporarily by assuming a liability to be repaid. The Federal Government can spend (crediting private sector bank accounts) at any time independent of tax 'revenues' and bond 'proceeds' (both of which are erroneous descriptions). There is no operational constraint that prevents it from doing so. (There is a self-imposed constraint, i.e. the debt ceiling, but that does nothing to alter the underlying mechanics of Government spending). As such the concept of 'income' for a sovereign currency issuer is meaningless. There is no operational constraint preventing the Federal Government from honoring any US Dollar denominated obligation, such as interest payments on US Treasury bonds.

US Government spending and Treasury issuance is clearly not 'debt'. It is nothing more than the accumulated net financial assets of the non-Government sector. The interest payments on which the US Government never has any operational constraint from honoring. It is not a 'burden'. It is not a 'problem that will be handed to our grandchildren'. It is nothing of the sort. They are accumulated net savings. Nothing more fancy than that.

-- Why does the US Government Issue Bonds? History of Bond Issuance, Self-Imposed Debt Ceiling Constraints, Reserves, OMO, and QE

As was detailed above, US Government bonds 'fund' absolutely nothing. They are not a 'burden' to anybody, and are nothing more than the accumulated net savings of the Non-Government sector. So then, what to bonds 'do'?

They allow the Federal Reserve to maintain its target short term rate. Deposits within the banking system create reserves. A bank manager has a few options with what to do with those reserves, after using a portion of those reserves to ensure balances are cleared and other maintenance activities, and to maintain reserve requirements (and it is worth noting that many banking systems in other countries have no reserve requirements at all). They could let it sit in the vault as cash (earning no interest). They could keep it on account at the Federal Reserve (which relatively recently now earn a mere 25 bp, they earned 0 for a very long time before that). They could lend the reserves overnight (at an interest premium) on the interbank lending network to banks that require reserves to meet requirements. Or one of the few options beyond that is the purchase of US Government bonds. Reserves are not lent out. With the purchase of the bonds the banks are able to earn more interest in a very liquid asset (the US Treasury market is by far the biggest on the planet).

This is how this manifests in the current system: The Federal Reserve has a mandate to maintain short term interest rates consistent with its policy goals. If the banking system has a system-wide deficit of reserves relative to requirements, then competition overnight on the interbank network will drive up the short term interest rate. The Fed reacts to this by buying US Treasury bonds on the open market and prints reserves (out of thin air) in exchange for those bonds. The result is a system wide increase in reserves and a system wide decrease in the amount of US Government bonds (an asset swap). This allows the Fed to put a cap on the short term interest rate relative to its policy goals. On the flip side, If the banking system has an excess amount of reserves relative to requirements, then competition overnight on the interbank network will drive down the short term interest rate. The Fed reacts to this by selling US Treasury bonds from its portfolio on the open market. The banks trade their reserves in exchange for the bonds. The result is a system wide decrease in reserves and a system wide increase in the amount of US Government bonds (again, nothing but an asset swap). Since the Fed is the entity that 'printed' those reserves to begin with, they disappear 'into the ether' when they are returned to the Fed's balance sheet.

For more on OMO and QE (which is functionally identical to OMO) and the role reserves play in our financial system (and dispelling the myths of the Money Multiplier), see here, here, and here

Here is are the key points about US Government bonds:

1 ) The US Federal Government spends (via the US Treasury) by crediting private sector bank accounts at the Federal Reserve
2) There is a Congressional constraint that all US Federal Government spending be matched by Government Bond sales
3) There is a 'debt ceiling' associated with the size of outstanding Government bonds
4) Both 2 and 3 are self-imposed constraints with historical origins and neither are an operational constraint to Federal Spending
5) The US Federal Government is monopoly issuer of the US Dollar, is the source of all Dollars, and can never 'not' have Dollars
6) From 5, the US Federal Government can never become 'insolvent' in terms of honoring US Dollar denominated obligations. The only way it cannot honor its Dollar denominated obligations is if it *willingly decides* not to pay them. This is another self-imposed constraint, not an operational one
7) Net Federal Government spending (spending in excess of taxation) creates net deposits which creates net reserves in the banking system. An increase in reserves pushes down the overnight lending rate. The Federal Reserve maintains control of its target overnight rate by selling US government bonds from its portfolio (via OMO) to ensure demand for reserves (the overnight interest rate) matches its target policy rate.

When all these points are considered, it becomes obvious that the US Government bond market:

a) Does not *fund* anything (It did under a convertible currency standard but does not under a fiat currency floating exchange rate standard)
b) Provides the non government sector with interest income which the US Government will always be able to provide since it is monopoly issuer of the US Dollar
c) Has relevance in the US Monetary System to facilitate liquidity management operations.

That's it.

Bonds serve no funding purpose now. They serve a place in the very convoluted process of OMO to drain reserves in order to allow the Central Bank to hit its target rate. But this could be much more easily accomplished by simply paying a remuneration rate at the target rate on all reserves. They are absolutely unnecessary to the functioning of a fiat currency system.

Here is where things get interesting when you consider how the current monetary system actually works and how unnecessary some (many) of the current components are. As shown above, Government bonds don't fund anything and their primary purpose for existence is to drain reserves in the banking system. This leads you to some very interesting conclusions:

1. The natural rate of interest is zero. As the government deficit spends to match the savings desires of the private sector, reserves accumulate in the banking system. Without government bonds to act as a reserve drain, then the supply of reserves will push the overnight lending rate to zero.

2. The 'loanable funds' theory is garbage. The current thought behind austerity is that government spending is 'crowding out' private investment, that as the government spends it pushes *up* interest rates, which raises the costs to access 'capital'. And we can plainly see that based on point 1 this is completely false. Deficit spending is the one and only mechanism that allows for net financial assets to accumulate in the private sector.

-- So why did Government bonds exist in the first place?

Since 1971 the gold window was closed. And as I show here this was accompanied by some very ad hoc activities. Namely the issue of the continued issuance of US Government bonds. Since the US Dollar is no longer convertible into gold, it is no longer debt in the literal sense that it had under the gold standard.

Under the Gold Standard the US Government was required to have all currency issued backed by gold. When the government need to finance spending (say to pay for a stimulus or a war) in excess of held gold reserves, the US government would issue bonds. In this case, the term financing is accurate, US Government bonds under the gold standard were most definitely debt. The US Dollar, being convertible into gold, had that constraint on it. Which meant that the US government was most definitely revenue constrained. That taxes were a repayment of Dollars such that the outstanding liability of conversion back into gold was reduced. Under Congressional mandate, all spending in excess of taxation must be accompanied by US Government bond sales. Sometimes the non-government sector would buy the Government bonds. But sometimes they would be bought by the Federal Reserve. And this is where the term 'debt monetization' comes from. Under the gold standard, US Dollars were convertible into gold which made US Government bonds, which were convertible into Dollars, indirectly convertible into gold. So when the Federal Reserve would issue currency in exchange for those bonds, the debt would become 'monetized'.

That is very different that what happens today in a fiat currency system, and why 'debt monetization' is (at best) an inapplicable and (more often at worst) highly misleading concept.

-- Do they need to exist now? What would happen if the US Government stopped issuing bonds tomorrow?

From the perspective of the US Federal Government being able to spend .... NOTHING. It would still credit private sector bank accounts at the Federal Reserve (move numbers in a spreadsheet) just like it does today. But it would stop doing the additional step of issuing bonds as it did the crediting.

This would mean that reserves would build up in the banking system and competition for reserves would become very small, pushing the overnight rate to zero (just like it is right now with the current level of excess reserves). So basically nothing would happen that isn't already happening in the banking system.

In fact, the US Government doesn't have to void all the current bonds. Just stop issuing new ones. The old ones will then expire at maturity and the whole US Government bond system will just gradually go away over the next 3 decades (however the average bond duration held by the non-government sector is something like 6 years so it would lose relevance much sooner in actuality).

At sometime in the future, if the Federal Reserve wanted a non-zero Fed Funds Rate, it could just start paying a remuneration rate on all reserves held at the Fed. That would become the new interest rate floor, and the unnecessary song and dance of OMO could be avoided altogether.

The Private sector would come up with some new benchmark (instead of the 10 year and 30 year US Treasury bonds) to price longer term loans (corporate loans, mortgages, etc.).

When you follow this logic all the way through, you come to this very simple and inescapable conclusion:

The US Federal Government does not need the US Federal Government Bond Market (Primary Dealers, Secondary Dealers, PIMCO, etc.) to provide it with funds, IT IS THE OTHER WAY AROUND!!

-- The Debt Ceiling and Self-Imposed Constraints

The fact of the matter is, as unnecessary as it is for the US government to issue bonds, it still does. And as meaningless as it is for the US government to have a debt ceiling, it still has one.

Other than simply stopping bond issuance (which is my preferred approach) like I discuss above, there are other ways to get around this debt ceiling charade. This is a very viable approach.

However, a self-imposed constraint is still a constraint. It is exactly like a runner tying their shoelaces together before running a marathon. It makes no sense, but it will still prevent the runner from accomplishing their objective (which is to run a race).

Until we stop issuing bonds or remove the debt ceiling or implement a coin seigniorage policy to avoid the debt ceiling, the US Government will continue to trip on their shoelaces from this bogus and contrived self-imposed constraint.

2. MMT and 'Free Lunches'

Okay, if MMT tells us that the US Government can spend at any time independent of inflows by crediting private sector bank accounts, then why aren't we all rich? Why doesn't the Government just credit all of our bank accounts by $10,000. Or $100,00. Or $10,000,000?

Because there is no Free Lunch. MMT certainly does not say there are 'free lunches', and MMT certainly does not suggest that course of action is a 'good' thing. There is nothing operationally preventing the US government from crediting any private sector bank account by any amount of money, but there are implications to any fiscal policy decision the government makes.

The constraint is inflation.

Every American could be a billionaire tomorrow if the Government credited a sufficient number of bank accounts, but the result would be the massively increased net financial assets chasing the same amount of goods. So this is obviously not a viable fiscal policy strategy.

However there are very different manifestations of inflation and they are not all the same. These will be discussed in the next section.

But first let us discuss some implementations of fiscal policy and to show how those decisions affect the economy. Because there are no 'free lunches' there as well.

The Government deficit spends when G - T > 0, or rearranged, when G > T. That is government spending in excess of taxation. The difference is one of the important values. A $10 Trillion deficit would exist if a) G = $11 Trillion and T = $1 Trillion, or if b) G = $100 Trillion and T = $90 Trillion. It is a net spending position.

Both conditions would satisfy the macroeconomic sectoral balance equation if the two non-Government sectors were saving $10 trillion. But do both conditions affect the economy in the same way?

Money does circulate through the economy (spending = income) such that the non-government sector *as a whole* has access to that money. But as we know the economy is not uniform and money does not distribute through the economy uniformly.

Spending is the mechanism by which the government encourages / stimulates economic activity. It could spend in the Defense sector, or Healthcare, or Financials, etc. And each spending decision affects the economy differently. In particular the sector/company/individual that receives the money first from the Government has the ability to mark up the highest profit margin (unless it is specifically prohibited from doing so as some Defense contractors are) before they make their spending decisions (which becomes the receiving party's income). As such, parties that are first in line for Government spending get the biggest benefit from it. This aspect will be discussed further in a bit.

Taxation on the other hand can be seen as discouragement / drain of economic activity. If for example the government wanted to discourage real estate speculation (other than through lending regulations, which were extremely lax at the time of the housing boom) it could levy special purpose real estate taxes. If it wanted to encourage employment, it could remove payroll taxes. Remember, Federal taxes fund *nothing*. So the Government does not need to tax for 'revenue' purposes (even though that misnomer still exists). Since tax policy can be targeted, just like spending policies, the government can quash malinvestment by levying temporary taxes in overheating sectors of the economy. Or if the economy is in a balance sheet recession it could reduce the tax burden on working class citizens.

Remember these points as we will be revisiting them.

3. The Fiat Currency System and Inflation

As was elaborately detailed in this post it is unambiguously stated that the long term trend in inflation is in direct response to the long term deficit spending position of the United States.

Since the US Government is the only party that can create net financial assets, cumulative budget deficits that accumulate to the national debt is money that is 'persistent' within the financial system. At any given time in the economy there are real resources for sale. All things being equal, more fiat currency for the same resources => higher general prices.

*However* things are not equal all the time. There are times when competition for resources is fierce and there are times when competition for resources is mild. So at any given time a deficit spending position does not necessarily mean that general price levels will rise dramatically. Again, it all depends on the state of the underlying economy.

Besides Federal deficit spending, horizontal credit booms can also affect inflation. Let's say one takes out a loan (or margin) to speculate on oil futures because they think the price of oil is going up due to inflation concerns. Lets further control this example by saying there is no fundamental reason at that time for inflation concerns, and oil demand and production stays the same. If more buyers than sellers felt this way then the price of oil would rise. The oil price rise is a very real event. We could attribute this to 'inflation'. But lets say that the buying pressure abates and the oil price starts to fall. Then there are net sellers and maybe even margin calls as people try to cover their positions. At the end of that cycle all of the the horizontally loaned money had to be repaid (because the lenders held those loans as liabilities). This is another example of a self-extinguishing credit boom/bust cycle.

This is the manifestation of credit booms (which put upward pressure on prices) and credit busts (which put downward pressure on prices) on inflation. Since all horizontal money creation is matched by an equal sized liability (activity within the banking system does not create *net* assets), horizontal transactions cannot generate long term inflation. It can create cyclical booms and busts as credit cycles begin and then implode. This could be modeled as something like a sine wave. (Oscillation about a mean value of zero as prices overshoot, mean-revert, and then undershoot).

Whereas vertical money creation has no corresponding liability. This does create net assets in the financial system. So while there are now still credit booms and busts, they can be modeled more like a sine wave superimposed on the deficit growth line (Oscillation about a non-zero and positively increasing mean value).

-- Myths regarding the 'Money Supply' causing Inflation

The problem with using any version of the money supply is that it lumps together vertically and horizontally created money. I have talked about the difference extensively above. The Federal Reserve cannot generate net financial assets, since it can only swap reserves for assets that already exist. It does 'money printing' in only a literal and trivial sense. This would be different if the Fed started paying a remuneration rate, but they don't so I won't detail that complication right now. It can only swap reserves for existing net financial assets, and the only party that can generate those net financial assets to begin with is the Treasury.

This is important because 'money supply' analysis mixes both horizontal and vertical money and as such has no predictive ability regarding inflation or deflation.

Consider the current failure of this type of analysis. "The Fed added 1 Trillion in reserves to the monetary base! This is going to be massively inflationary (if not hyperfinflationary)!!". .... Where exactly is this hyperinflation? Nowhere. Okay, then where is the 'massive' inflation? Nowhere? hmm.....Why is that?

Because the Money Multiplier model is a myth (see here and here). And even if it did work (which it doesn't) then all it would do is describe some mechanism of horizontal money creation (not vertical money creation). This means that the Quantity Theory of Money is also incorrect in describing how inflation manifests. Because as was shown above, horizontal money creation can only lead to credit booms and busts, not long term inflation.

Instead of swapping 1 Trillion of reserves for Treasuries, the Fed could swap 10 Trillion and the effect would be equally meaningless. Because monetary policy cannot be enforced strictly from the supply (lending) side. In fact, the demand (borrowing) side of the equation is far more important. *BUT* even if the Fed could induce another lending boom right now, it would be completely horizontal. Which means it would lead to a private sector credit boom followed by a credit sector credit bust (just like 2002-2007 lending boom, 2007-20xx bust / balance sheet recession).

Monetary policy is largely worthless. It can cause all kinds of dislocations and malinvestment when inflation expectations are high. It is spectacularly ineffective when inflation expectations / borrowing demand is low.

So the Monetary Base leverering up to some 'money supply' theory through the money multiplier model is wrong. Looking at MZM, M0, M1 and M2 to draw inflation conclusions is wrong. Looking at M3 is a little bit closer to correct, but that is simply because it captures a large portion of net financial assets, so using it from a 'money supply' perspective is wrong.

-- Cost-Push vs. Demand-Pull Inflation

The previous section discussed the differences between vertically created money and horizontally created money on both short term and long term inflation trends. This section discusses the two main types of inflation and how they manifest.

Demand-pull inflation is caused by too much government spending when the economy is operating near full capacity. If we have an economy running near full capacity, high utilization of resources (including and most especially employment) => low unemployment and a positive current account, then a Government Budget Deficit (G-T > 0) is exactly the *wrong* position for the government to take. Because all resources are already bid for at the prices where they produce useful economic output. Further increase of net financial assets into that environment does not cause any further economic output to take place it just raises the general price level across all components of the CPI index.

Cost-push inflation can happen independent of the government spending position. It is not driven by primarily by either vertical money creation or the credit boom of horizontal money creation, but by production control. The obvious example is oil imports for the US. The US is the worlds biggest energy importer and is especially sensitive / at the mercy of OPEC. They are price setters in this scheme (OPEC has general price targets and varies production quantity to meet those targets) and the US just has to take it. Food production being energy intensive is also subject to this effect which is why food and energy prices have been moving (mostly) in a similar fashion. These rises can be affected by the deficit spending position, but they are primarily driven by production controls or constraints. As another constraint consider that oil is in demand across the globe, so low 'money creation' and low oil demand in one country might still see oil import prices rise based on this dynamic.

-- What is the inflation environment like right now?

Currently we are back up to 3% inflation. However this is not 'uniform' inflation across all components that make up an inflation index. Inflation is high for energy and food (which is cost-push inflation), moderate inflation for healthcare (which is another victim of price setting based on policy decisions), low/no inflation for most of the other components, and *deflation* in housing. This very uneven inflation environment is telling us directly that current deficit spending is not resulting in demand-pull inflation.

We have relatively low utilization of resources, including and most especially unemployment (>9% official employment and closer to 30% underemployment), we have wealth concentrated in a few sectors (especially Financials), a sluggish economy, low core CPI. This means that the current deficit spending position of the US will not result in demand-pull inflation, which substantiates the above view.

4. Current Macroeconomic Environment

The reason why this discussion is important is because policy decisions must be based on this type of analysis. The health of the underlying private domestic sector must be gauged when the government decides to alter its spending position.

Consumers are in a balance sheet recession. They are trying to pay down debt. Debt/income for the private domestic sector is >110%. So from a sectoral balance of the macroeconomy, (S-I) savings - investment, or net savings, by the private domestic sector will need to be a large positive quantity (something on the order of several percent of GDP, maybe 5-10%) for a very long time as that debt is being paid off. At the same time we continue to have a current account deficit. Exports minus imports (X-M) is a negative number (something on the order of 3% of GDP). This means that since S-I is positive (and will stay that way since the private domestic sector has a continued savings desire because they want to [NEED to] pay down debt accumulated during the last cycle of 2002-2007), and we have a current account deficit, then (S-I) - (X-M) is a positive quantity. This is precisely why the private sector has been able to net save up to this point, because the government has been running a deficit (G-T) > 0 (and on the order of 10%).

This type of analysis gives key insight into the interrelationship of the 3 macro sectors, but it far from tells the whole story.

Because as I discussed above, money does not move through the private domestic sector evenly. Those sectors directly receiving the Government spending have a tremendous financial advantage to those who get the spending second-hand. What this means is that even though the private domestic sector desires to net save something like 5-10% of GDP, the section of the private domestic sector that needs those assets the most (to pay down debt) are likely only getting a small fraction of those net savings.

This leads to another critique of MMT, which is a 'feed the beast' mentality. We have anemic economic activity yet the government has had large deficit spending positions for the last few years. MMT advocates continued deficit spending because the sectoral balance is clear: for the private sector to net save with a current account deficit, we must deficit spend. But all of this deficit spending doesn't seem to be 'fixing' anything. From a non-MMTer point of view, it seems like we are just 'feeding the best'. The sectoral balance equation must hold ... but we need to think about the situation more deeply in order to advocate for specific policy decisions.

5. Bad Fiscal Policy Decisions / The Financialization of the US Economy

This section will bring together the economic dislocation observations stated above and major sources of unproductive activity in the economy

The Clinton Administration in 1999 made one of the worst policy decisions ever enacted: the repeal of Glass-Steagall. This was the legislation enacted during the Great Depression that prevented banks (with a charter able to accept deposits from the public) from also being investment banks. The repeal of this act consolidated the shadow banking system with the real banking system and was the single biggest step in creating a "Too Big To Fail" industry.

Since that time many horrible policies were enacted under the G.W. Bush Administration that allowed the financial sector to gain more power, more influence, to deregulate itself, to engage in financial innovation.

The financial sector is non-productive, but it is not useless. There are a list of several vital functions that a financial sector must provide:

• Central bank oversight of the payments system.
• Capital adequacy standards for financial institutions.
• Bank depositor protection.
• An institutional lender-of-last resort when private institutions refuse to lend to solvent borrowers in times of liquidity crisis.
• An institution to ameliorate coordination failure among private investors/creditors.
• The provision of exit strategies to insolvent institutions.

But this list of functions can be accommodated by a financial system that is a small fraction of the size of today's system. The size of the financial system today is a direct result of several years of bad policy decisions.

6. Creative Destruction within a Deficit Spending Policy Stance and Promoting Healthy Economic Activity

The size of today's financial system allows it to gain access to politicians (the financial sector has by far the biggest, most well-paid and influential lobbyists). It has positioned itself to be of the the biggest beneficiaries of government spending.

What should have happened during the last crisis was for the FDIC to resolve the insolvent institutions and break them up. Creative destruction should have been allowed to happen for an industry that was clearly too large to be stable. This is one of the hallmarks of efficient capitalism. Instead what happened was that the financial sector received the biggest portion of the stimulus and bail-outs.

So for all those who criticize MMT under the 'feeding the beast' theme, MMT absolutely did not advocate for this propping up of failed institutions. Professor L. Randall Wray was a critic of the bailouts (see his thoughts on financial reform in the first part of this video).

The bailouts of the financial system was a massive failure of public policy. It was not a failure of either capitalism or MMT.

Despite massive stimulus / deficit spending the last few years, much of it was spent on propping up insolvent institutions. Deficit spending is not to blame for this scenario, it is the direct decision of policy makers at the time and even now to continue to support these institutions.

One of the single best decisions that could be made is to reinstate Glass-Steagall. Today. To say that banks with a charter cannot do proprietary trading, investment banking, etc. If the shadow banking system want to take risks, it should not do so with either implicit or explicit public backing.

Which brings us to now.

The US economy still has all of the problems listed above in section 4. The US economy also has the problem of a financial system whose size and instability still pose a systemic risk. What do we do?

Recall above that there is no danger of running a budget deficit. It does not raise the specter of 'insolvency' for the Government, it does not 'crowd out' private investment. Other than a completely manufactured 'debt ceiling crisis' there is no issues to continue to run deficits. But the government must make decisions about what spending it wants to support.

We could spend it on financialization of the economy (non-productive), we could spend it on one-time stimulus with no lasting effect like the Homebuyer Tax Credit or Cash for Clunkers (non-productive), and we could then just continue with that path and run deficits to service the interest payments on Treasuries (non-productive). Deficits just by themselves can 'prop' economic activity but will not necessarily lead to productive economic activity.

On the other hand, the Government could cut the deficit to 'clean house'. To allow insolvent institutions to fail and to 'take our medicine'..... I call this mentality 'cutting off your nose to spite your face'.

When Government forces a balanced budget, then (G-T) = 0. This means that since we will still be running a current account deficit (we won't magically become a net exporter instead of a net importer overnight), then by definition (S-I) will go negative. This means the private domestic sector will no longer be able to net save (despite needing to desperately). The private sector is in no position to undergo a new credit boom (NOR SHOULD IT!).

This means that economic activity will massively slow down as the private sector attempts to meet their savings desires. It simply bears pointing out that in the midst of a balance sheet recession where the private domestic sector desires to net save and we have a current account deficit that no Government Deficits will lead directly to a loss of economic activity. That is a factual conclusion based on a sectoral balance of the macroeconomy.

This also means that along with the industries that the Government is trying to 'clean' there will be a lot of 'collateral damage'. Like hardworking lower and middle class American's who are trying to save money and pay down debt in the middle of this sluggish economy. Who are trying to do the right thing despite a Government that has bailed out everybody except them. A balanced budget, with the private domestic sector desiring to net save and with economic activity slowing, would result in firms likely to lower inventories and staff. This means likely unemployment will rise. With a balanced budget the automatic stabilizers (unemployment benefits, food stamps, etc.) will be severely cut back and thus unemployment will be a much larger drag on economic activity that it would be under a deficit spending position. This further reinforces the above conditions, etc.

A 'Cut, Cap and Balance' approach is spitting in the face of these Americans, whether they realize it or not.

I propose a different approach

The sectoral balance for our current economic environment is clear: The private domestic sector desires to net save and we have a current account deficit => The Government *must* run a deficit to allow the private domestic sector's savings desires to be realized.

This means a Federal Government budget deficit is required in this environment. It does not pose any 'solvency' risk (as elaborated above), and because the economic environment is weak does not pose a significant inflation risk (as elaborated above). But while the sectoral balance tells us a deficit is needed, it doesn't say how it needs to be implemented. This is where we draw on previous observations regarding how money from Government spending moves through the economy and how unproductive (and dangerous) the financial sector is.

The biggest obstacle in the current environment is the no current direct spending paths to help Main Street. In particular all stimulus plans have been 'jobs poor' (propping up financial institutions spends a lot of money but does not create jobs).

A) Remove all subsides and stimulus from the financial sector immediately.

Reinstate Glass-Steagall. Make banks choose whether they want to be a regular bank or an investment bank. Without stimulus likely some of those institutions will fail. Resolve them. Do not prop them up via bail outs. We need to start breaking down the 'Too Big Too Fail' structure now, immediately, while insolvent banks can fail in a non-crisis environment. This will facilitate orderly resolution of these institutions to other more efficient institutions that are prepared to handle those assets. Allow 'Creative Destruction' to work the way it was intended to.

B) Implement an Energy Independence Initiative

The cost-push inflation that the US has endured with energy prices is a direct result of the trade imbalance and short-sightedness for decades in assuming uninterrupted access to cheap and plentiful oil. The biggest thing the US could do to smooth out this source of inflation is not to have better monetary policy (which is mostly worthless anyways), but to really become serious about energy independence. That is the only real solution.

We have massive under-utilization of resources and can 'afford' (literally and figuratively) to implement a massive spending project that has a number of long term and short term benefits:

1) Long Term Energy Independence - This will significantly reduce future cost-push inflation spikes from volatile energy prices.

2) This will be a very large long term industry providing long term employment.

3) This will help with the current large unemployment situation as we can soak up a lot of those underutilized resources.

The projects included in an energy independence plan would be: Implementation of a Natural Gas Policy Agenda (the US has abundant Natural Gas resources), which would include increased storage and pipelining and require resources to build those (materials and labor), Subsidies/Grants to start transitioning the auto fleet from Oil to NG, more efficient people and freight moving systems (such as Rofgile's high speed rail idea), Investment in alternative energy power generation projects (Wind, Solar [PVs, CSPs], etc.), etc.

All of these projects would cost a lot of money (which we could afford to deficit spend right now), a lot of materials (China already appears to be slowing and they already have large materials stockpiles, so this plan would have upward pressure metals/materials prices but probably not as much as it would say 5 years ago), and a lot of labor (and with >9% unemployment, that would be a good solution). But the long term benefits would be enormous. I think they would be akin to the benefits from the Interstate Highway system.

C) Implement a Job Guarantee Program

For the unemployed that wouldn't be soaked up by project B above, a Job Guarantee would fill in the gap. Thoughts on plans of that nature here and here (skip down to the section What is the Job Guarantee?).

More on why a Balanced Budget is the worst possible economic idea

I suppose the only economic idea that is worse than a "Balanced Budget" proposal would be a "Balanced Budget Amendment" proposal (making this absolutely horrible idea into a law).

The reason why this idea is so bad is that it *forces* fiscal policy to be pro-cyclical. From here

Balanced budget amendments are another one of these artificial constraints that look better on paper than they do in reality because they are procyclical.

In the eurozone, the stability and growth pact provides a 3% deficit hurdle which almost all of the euro zone breached during the recession. Austerity attempts to meet the hurdle we see have created larger deficits in the periphery (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland).

The same problems were apparent in the US states where balanced budget amendments are the order of the day. Before Barack Obama entered the White House, I asked in January 2009 “Will federal largesse be countered by state and local cutbacks?” By June 2010, it was obvious the answer was yes. That’s what procyclicality means.

Procyclicality is fine for states as a constraint despite how they exacerbate the swings in the business cycle, creating deadweight losses. The federal government can always counter this pro-cyclicality and smooth out the cycle. This is one of the structural flaws of the euro zone; there is no federal agent to do this, and, thus, the business cycle will invariably be volatile.

Now, America is looking to impose the same sort of procyclicality on the US federal government. When downturns hit, revenues drop because tax receipts drop due to income shortfalls and spending increases because of automatic stabilisers. So, a balanced budget amendment would require even more cuts. But since those cuts reduce income and tax receipts, you need enough cuts to overcome the negative revenue effects on the budget. That means a balanced budget amendment would require deep, deep cuts in federal spending at precisely the worst moment in the business cycle. That’s procyclicality.

This is a recipe for disaster. And it will lead to huge volatility in the business cycle, deadweight economic losses and growth underperformance. If you hear anyone telling you this is a good mechanism for reining in deficit spending, you will know they haven’t thought through the effects of procyclicality.


What we have learned from the MMT Framework discussion in Section 1 above is that not only does deficit spending not impose any solvency risk for the US Government, the Government sector is the *only* sector of the macroeconomy that can expand its balance sheet on demand. This means that the Government spending position should *NOT* be discretionary and instead be driven by the current account balance and the saving desires of the private domestic sector

The signal for excess or deficient government spending as outlined in detail above in Section 3. is demand-pull inflation. When the economy is running near full capacity, and resources are fully utilized (including and most especially employment => low unemployment) then the Government should run a Balanced Budget. Not before that. The clarification of course being a clearing out of major unproductive economic behavior should be part of any spending plan.

7. The Ineffectiveness of using/changing the Monetary System as a Guard against Bad Policy Decisions / Politicians

Bad policies under a convertible currency standard will produce bad results. Just like bad policies under a fiat currency floating exchange rate standard will produce bad results. There is nothing intrinsic about either system that precludes the possibility of wasted output, unemployment, economic malaise, etc.

The problem right now is that so many are using convertible currency economic models to draw conclusions / make policy recommendations for what to do in our fiat currency system. It is comparing apples and oranges, and is bad macroeconomics. We need to first understand how our system actually operates and to dispel inapplicable causes/effects that would occur under a different monetary system.

MMT is not a panacea (simply understanding it won’t prevent one from making bad decisions based on good information), but understanding it will prevent policy makers from making basic *mistakes* (making bad decisions based on bad information).

A corrupt state will attempt to prop itself up regardless of the monetary system. MMT is useful in that if understood and used correctly could smooth out pro-cyclical tendencies of the business cycle, by understanding how money enters into our system. But it requires understanding and *discipline* to not turn that spending into the propping up of non-productive sectors.

Unfortunately the 'lack of discipline' aspect is the problem with government. It was a problem under the Gold Standard (which caused the issuance of bonds in the first place as well as implementation of the Federal Reserve). It is a problem under our current monetary system with the propping up of Financials.

There is no guard against bad policy. And if we think we can change the monetary system to prevent bad policy decisions from happening (which we can't) then we need new politicians. It's as simple as that.